Managers can improve real risk-adjusted firm performance by matching nominal assets with nominal liabilities, thereby reducing the sensitivity of real risk-adjusted returns to unexpected inflation. The Net Asset Value (NAV) of US equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) serves as a good proxy for nominal assets and accordingly we use a sample of US REITs to test our hypothesis. We find that for the firms in our sample: (i) their real, risk-adjusted performance, and (ii) their inflation hedging qualities are inversely related to deviations from this "matching-nominals" argument. In addition to providing managers with a vehicle to maximise real, risk-adjusted performance, our findings also provide investors with the tools to infer inflation-hedging qualities of equity investments.
Introduction
One of the fundamental motivations for investing in financial assets is arguably to accumulate wealth in order to fund future consumption (Merton, 1969) . The ability to consume out of wealth is determined by its real purchasing power. However, the purchasing power of wealth depends on the price level and is thus a real, rather than a nominal concept (Ritter, 2002) . From this point of view, firm managers should aim to maximise real, rather than nominal, risk-adjusted performance. Managers can arguably influence real risk-adjusted firm performance through a variety of means, especially the pursuit of a suitable investment policy that determines the firm's asset structure. In this study, we argue that, conditional on a given asset structure, a firm can optimise its real risk-adjusted performance through the choice of an appropriate financing policy. We propose that real risk-adjusted returns to equity are a function of the firm's holdings of nominal and real assets and liabilities and that managers can optimise real, risk-adjusted returns by matching the holdings of nominal liabilities with nominal assets.
Real risk-adjusted performance is difficult to optimise partly due to the variation in the general price level. In an efficient market, the returns on nominal contracts account for expected inflation (Bach and Stephenson, 1974; Fama, 1970) . However, the uncertainty surrounding unexpected inflation is more difficult to manage. Figure 1 shows that expected US CPI inflation averaged 0.2% per month between 1989 and 2011. However, over the same time period, the volatility of monthly unexpected inflation also averaged 0.2%. These statistics suggest that under a Normal distribution, there is a c. 15% chance that inflation was more than twice as high, in a given month, as expected. Furthermore, unexpected inflation has increased over the last 22 years, peaking at 0.6% per month in 2008. This observation suggests that the risk of unexpected inflation is of growing importance, especially given the uncertain longer-term consequences of recent expansionary monetary policy measures.
The net balance of nominal assets and liabilities influences the real return to equity, as well as its volatility, by modifying the exposure of equity to expected and unexpected inflation risks. Real risk-adjusted performance, ceteris paribus, is conditionally maximised when nominal liabilities are matched with nominal assets in an increasing, monotonic fashion. The appropriate choice of nominal liabilities for a given level of nominal assets reduces the volatility of the real return to equity by attenuating the impact of unexpected inflation, thereby improving the risk efficiency of an investment in the firm's equity.
Previous authors have found it difficult to identify and measure nominal and real assets and liabilities (Amihud, 1996; French, Ruback, and Schwert, 1983) . We study a sample of US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to test the "matchingnominals" hypothesis. REITs represent a useful case study because they follow a regulated business model of investing in and deriving income from operating real estate assets, which simplifies the composition of their balance sheet. We employ the net asset value (NAV) of the REITs as our proxy for nominal assets. Detailed data on REIT NAVs is available from SNL Financial: a specialist REIT data provider.
Our empirical evidence suggests that the NAV is insensitive to inflation, confirming that it represents a suitable proxy for nominal assets. In sum, our focus on REITs enables us to distinguish effectively between real and nominal assets and liabilities, reducing potential measurement errors and increasing the power of our empirical tests.
Our argument produces two main testable implications. First, if our rationale is correct, then we expect firms whose nominal assets are more closely linked to nominal liabilities to deliver stronger real risk-adjusted performance, ceteris paribus. Further, we also expect these firms to offer stronger inflation hedging qualities to their equity investors, ceteris paribus. Consequently, we explore empirically whether real riskadjusted firm performance and the strength of a firm's inflation hedging qualities decline in the deviation from the match between nominal assets and liabilities that we propose. We find that departures from this match significantly reduce real riskadjusted performance as measured by the real Sharpe ratio, and also significantly impair inflation hedging qualities.
Our findings have several implications for managers and investors. We offer a simple rule that allows managers to improve real risk-adjusted performance and hedge unexpected inflation. Further, our results imply that investors can infer inflation hedging capabilities of equity investments from the firm's capital structure. In addition, our findings suggest that firms may hold leverage in excess of firm-characteristic informed target levels in order to manage the exposure of equity to unexpected inflation risks and improve real risk-adjusted performance. Our results also contribute to the debate about the inflation-hedging qualities of equities investments. We suggest that variation in these qualities may be a function of capital structure.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents the model alongside a set of simulation results to derive testable implications. Section 3 presents data, method and descriptive statistics, Section 4 discusses our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Real risk-adjusted returns and capital structure The Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) states that nominal risk-adjusted returns cannot be improved through capital structure, as investors can employ home-made leverage to replicate the financing strategy of the firm. However, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) argue that there are leverageconstrained investors, such as pension funds, who are unable to employ home-made leverage. Consistent with this view, we argue that these leverage-constrained investors benefit from delegating the management of capital structure choices to the firm. On the other hand, unconstrained investors are still in a position to leverage and de-leverage in order to manage capital structure, performance and inflation hedging objectives independently at no extra cost. On balance, a firm is able to increase the supply of its capital by expanding the potential investor base to include leverage-constrained investors by actively managing the firm's capital. In this context, a manager acting in the interests of shareholders will manage capital to maximise the real, risk-adjusted return to equity.
Consider a simple, mature firm that holds a combination of assets and liabilities, each of which can be classified as either nominal or real. Contracts whose value fluctuates with the prevailing price level are classified as real contracts and contracts whose value is uncorrelated with the prevailing price level are classified as nominal contracts. The asset structure of the firm is determined exogenously via its investment policy. Once the asset holding has been determined, the manager's objective is then to identify an appropriate liability structure that will maximise the real, risk-adjusted returns to equity.
If we consider a simple one-period, deterministic framework and let E 0 denote the market price of firm equity at time t = 0, defined as the sum ofthe market value of real and nominal assets and liabilities:
where M V A R 0 and M V L R 0 are the market values of the firm's real assets and liabil-ities at time t = 0, and where M V A N 0 and M V L N 0 are the corresponding market values of the nominal assets and liabilities. We assume E 0 > 0. At t = 1, unexpected inflation has caused the general price level to change at rate e u so that the value of firm equity at t = 1, E 1 , is then:
where r is the premium for real corporate debt L R 0 over the risk-free rate measured at time t = 1. The variables κ and α represent the the premia that differentiates the return on assets from that on liabilities, and returns on nominal assets and liabilities from those on their real counterparts, respectively. The total, one-period, continuously compounded excess return on firm equity, R, is then given by:
Accounting for inflation, the one-period real excess return on firm equity, R R , is:
The sensitivity of real equity returns to unexpected inflation, S, is given by the partial derivative of R R with respect to u:
Setting S to zero and solving for the level of nominal liabilities yields:
That is, the sensitivity to unexpected inflation of real returns to equity is minimised by setting nominal liabilities to be in direct proportion to the nominal assets of the firm. If the net nominal position (assets minus liabilities) is zero, then the firms remaining real position will move in line with the general price level and so will generate real returns.
To maximise real, risk-adjusted returns to equity we optimise the trade-off between risk and return in the mean-variance framework, that is by maximising the real Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966 (Sharpe, , 1994 , defined as the ratio of the expectation and the standard deviation of R R :
We employ a set of simple simulations to illustrate the evolution of the components of SR R as a function of nominal assets and liabilities in a stochastic setting. We allow each of the variables, α, u, κ and r to be normally distributed such that: 1 return-reducing impact from this additional unit. However, the figure suggests that the Sharpe ratio-maximising amount of nominal liabilities is lower than the amount that minimises SD R R . This difference is due to the fact that, on average, a unitincrease in nominal liabilities reduces SD R R by less than it reduces E R R . This occurs because beyond the minimum of SD R R , an additional unit of nominal liabilities increases SD R R again. Therefore, the ratio between E R R and SD R R is maximised before SD R R is minimised.
The optimal, real Sharpe-ratio maximising amount of nominal liabilities is a positive linear function of nominal assets. For SD R R , the optimal trade-off between the costs and benefits of nominal assets and liabilities is achieved by linearly matching these items, as with the deterministic case (6). For the real Sharpe ratio, which is a direct function of SD R R , this optimal trade-off is still achieved by maintaining a linear matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities. However, the constant of proportionality appears to be smaller because, on average, a unit increase in nominal liabilities reduces SD R R by less than it reduces E R R . This differential impact shifts the optimal amount of nominal liabilities to the left. Figure 4 summarises the optimal linear relationship between nominal assets and liabilities that maximises SR R , given our simulation parameters. In both the deterministic and stochastic cases, the real , risk-adjusted return to equity is maximised by setting the amount of nominal liabilities to be a monotonically increasing, linear function of nominal assets.
Our central claim then, is that matching nominal assets and liabilities is associated with higher real risk-adjusted returns to equity. Hence we expect that deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities are inversely related to the firm's real Sharpe ratio. Further, any improvement in real risk-adjusted performance is related to a stronger hedge against unexpected inflation. In other words, we suggest that deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities are inversely related to unexpected inflation hedging qualities of an investment into the firm's equity. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The real Sharpe ratio of equity in the firm is inversely related to the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities.
Hypothesis 2: The unexpected inflation hedging qualities of equity are inversely re-lated to the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities.
Data and method
Several authors have noted difficulty with identifying a good proxy for nominal assets (Amihud, 1996; French, Ruback, and Schwert, 1983) . We employ the Net Asset Value (NAV) of US equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) as a proxy for nominal assets. Equity REITs mainly derive income from leasing real estate assets (Lehman and Roth, 2010) . Rental payments under existing leases may be fixed for considerable periods of time, if not the duration of the lease. Leases may reflect inflation through indexation clauses that periodically adjust the rent to the currently prevailing price level. However, given the discrete and infrequent nature of these reviews, rental payments are relatively insensitive to changes in the price level.
Therefore, property leases are often considered a nominal asset (Hoesli, Lizieri, and MacGregor, 2008; Zarowin, 1988) .
The NAV reflects the book value of these leases as it is calculated by discounting the expected rental income derived from these leases at an appropriate rate and deducting any debt employed in the acquisition of the underlying properties (Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 2003) . Consistent with the characteristics of nominal contracts in efficient markets (Bach and Stephenson, 1974; Fama, 1970) , the rental income projected on the basis of the leases will likely reflect expected inflation. However, these projections cannot account for unexpected inflation. Therefore, in line with the definition of nominal assets, the REIT's NAV does not reflect unexpected inflation.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the natural logarithm of NAV is unrelated to unexpected inflation (measured as the residuals after filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) ).
We use this insight to establish the suitability of Net Asset Value as a proxy for Nominal Assets. Recall that NAV is the difference between Gross Assets and Total Debt, or in terms of nominal assets and debt:
As NAV is insensitive to inflation, it follows that the real components have a negligible net impact on NAV. Hence we suggest that a good proxy for nominal assets is the sum of NAV and nominal debt. That is,
The optimal "matching-nominals" relationship is then captured by:
So the deviations from this relationship are then given by
withΘ given by the coefficient of the regression of nominal debt against NAV. While NAV is an imperfect proxy for nominal assets, the bias in using this proxy (β = Θ/(Θ + 1)) filters through so as to not obfuscate the inferences made using (L N − ΘN AV ) as the proxy for deviations from the "matching-nominals" relationship.
The suitability of our proxy is dependent upon the insentivity of NAV to unexpected inflation. Table 1 presents the results from a set of fixed-effects panel regressions of the natural logarithm of the firm's NAV as reported by SN L (discounted at an average rate of 7.5%) on unexpected inflation (Column (1)) and the lag of unexpected inflation (Column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) replicate these regressions in first differences. Based on these regression results, we accept that NAV is insensitive to unexpected inflation and so accept that our proxy for deviation (from the matching-nominals relationship) is sound. To proxy for nominal liabilities, we employ the firm's holdings of fixed-rate debt, following Flannery and James (1984) .
SN L provides detailed panel data on REIT NAV and fixed-rate debt.
We test our hypotheses using all listed US REITs (SIC code 6798), with the ex- We discard observations where the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, nominal assets to all assets or nominal liabilities to all liabilities lies outside the interval [0, 1].
All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. We measure earnings volatility and abnormal earnings contemporaneously to the observation of the dependent variable. We measure all other variables at the fiscal year-end prior to that (Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007; Johnson, 2003) .
Empirical method
Liability matching and real risk-adjusted performance First, we explore the relationship between real risk-adjusted performance and the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities. We relate a firm-year panel of the annual real Sharpe ratios (SR R ) of the REITs to a proxy for their annual deviations from this optimal match (DEV ). We obtain the annual real Sharpe ratios of the sample firms on the basis of monthly CRSP return data.
We argue that the Sharpe ratio-maximising amount of nominal liabilities is proportional to nominal assets. The optimal constant of proportionality may differ for each firm in each year, depending on the actual prevailing values of the parameters in our model. For the empirical implementation, we examine a number of alternatives for the parameter characterising the relationship between nominal assets and liabilities. We assume direct proportionality as the optimal relationship between nominal assets and liabilities. We measure the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities for each firm-year, DEV , by computing the annual squared differences between actual nominal liabilities and assets. 2
We estimate the following fixed-effects panel model:
where u it is the residual and standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011) . Real risk-adjusted performance may be viewed as a function of the firm's investment decisions and, as we suggest, its financing policy. We include dummies for the firm's property sector as a proxy for the firm's investment strategy.
The property sector of a REIT arguably determines the type of leases, including indexation clauses. Therefore, the property sector may have an immediate impact on real risk-adjusted performance. We also control for the set of capital structure controls from Table 2 . We account for latent economic shock factors using year dummies. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we expect a negative sign on β 1 in (8).
In order to explore the relative sensitivity of changes in the real Sharpe ratio to changes in the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities, we re-estimate equation (8) in first differences.
Liability matching and inflation hedging qualities
In order to examine the relationship between the unexpected inflation hedging qualities of an investment into the firm's equity and the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities, we relate the annual sensitivity of monthly nominal firm returns to unexpected inflation to the deviation variable, DEV . In the calculation of DEV , we assume direct proportionality between nominal assets and liabilities.
A stock is considered an inflation hedge if an inflationary shock does not affect real returns, or, equivalently, if an inflationary shock results in a positive change in nominal returns (Alchian and Kessel, 1959; Bodie, 1976; Branch, 1974; Fama and MacBeth, 1974; Lintner, 1973; Oudet, 1973) . It is not possible to provide statistical evidence for the absence of a relationship between real returns and inflation. Therefore, we examine the relationship between nominal returns and inflation. We estimate each firm's unexpected inflation hedging qualities using annual regressions of the nominal monthly excess firm returns (N RET ) on monthly unexpected inflation (U IN F L) and a set of controls. We compile a firm-year panel of the annual coefficients measuring the sensitivity of nominal firm returns to unexpected inflation. A higher positive coefficient value suggests stronger unexpected inflation hedging qualities.
We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) , and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. 3
In this regression, we control for the excess return on the market (M KT ), size (SM L) and value (HM L) factors, expected inflation (EXP IN ) and variation in the interest rate proxied by changes in the federal funds rate (CF F R):
where e it is the residual. We collect the γ 1 coefficients to compile a firm-year panel of unexpected inflation sensitivities U IN F LS. We then regress these U IN F LS on our proxy for the deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities (DEV ). We control for the usual set of capital structure determinants, including maturity, as well as property type and year dummies. We estimate the following fixed-effects panel model:
where u it is the residual. We remedy the bias in the standard errors from heteroskedasticity potentially introduced by the estimated dependent variable in (10) using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm (Lewis and Linzer, 2005; Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011) . Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we expect a negative sign on β 1 in (10).
In order to explore the relative sensitivity of changes in the firm's inflation hedging characteristics to changes in the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities, we re-estimate this specification in first differences. implies substantial variation in inflation hedging qualities. Our empirical results, discussed below, suggest that this variation may be related to capital structure choices. Table 5 presents the regression results for Hypothesis 1 over the study period 1989 to 2011. 4 Our results support the predicted relationship between the firm's liability structure and its real risk-adjusted performance. We find an inverse linear relationship between the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities and the real Sharpe ratio, after controlling for a set of variables reflecting that real risk-adjusted performance is the product of the firm's investment decisions and its financing choices. Our evidence is robust to different parameter choices for the constant of proportionality characterising the optimal matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities (Columns 1 to 3). Our result is consistent with our model's implication that capital structure choices and real risk-adjusted performance are related. Our finding suggests that, everything else being equal, a firm that adheres to the optimal matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities achieves a higher real Sharpe ratio. 5
Descriptive statistics

Results
However, our result also suggests that the relationship between the real Sharpe ratio and deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities is not strictly linear. Column 4 of Table 5 presents the effect of changes in the deviation from the optimal amount of nominal liabilities on changes in the real Sharpe ratio. 6
The corresponding coefficient is significantly negative. Larger deviations from the optimum appear to have a decreasing relative negative impact on the real Sharpe ratio. The marginal effect of an additional small shift away from the optimal amount of nominal liabilities appears to be decreasing. As a result, managers have a strong incentive to make small adjustments towards the optimal balance of nominal assets and liabilities when the current deviation is small. As this deviation becomes larger, the incentive to make more significant adjustments appears to become stronger.
Hypothesis 2 refers to the relationship between the firm's liability structure and its characteristics as a hedge against unexpected inflation. Table 6 , Column 1, presents the regression results of the firms' annual unexpected inflation betas on the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities. 7 Our results hold when controlling, amongst others, for the property sector of the REITs that we employ as a proxy for the investment strategy of the firm. This sector arguably determines the structure of the leases and thus the terms under which rents adjust to inflation. Our finding suggests that the liability structure of the firm has a significant impact on unexpected inflation hedging qualities that is separate from the influence of the asset and lease structures determined by the investment strategy of the firm.
More specifically, we find that deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities reduce the firm's unexpected inflation beta. In our empirical setting, a higher inflation beta stands for a higher sensitivity of the firm's nominal return to unexpected inflation. Therefore, a higher beta implies a superior hedge against unexpected inflation. Our results suggest that observing the linear relationship between nominal assets and liabilities modifies the sensitivity of the nominal 5 For robustness, we also explore the possibility of asymmetric consequences on real risk-adjusted performance of firms holding either excess or insufficient amounts of nominal liabilities. We augment the relevant regressions by an indicator for the sign of the raw deviation before squaring the difference in the construction of DEV . We find no evidence for such asymmetries, suggesting that any deviations from the optimal amount of nominal liabilities reduce real risk-adjusted performance, irrespective of their sign. 6 Given the robustness of our results to the different parameter choices for the constant to proportionality, we focus here on the directly proportional case. 7 Given the robustness of our results up to this point to the different choices for the constant of proportionality characterising the linear matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities, from now on, we focus our discussion on the results for the directly proportional case.
return on equity to unexpected inflationary shocks. Consequently, it appears that matching nominal assets and liabilities reduces the adverse effects of unexpected inflation. In combination, our findings suggest a conceptual link between capital structure choices, inflation hedging qualities and real risk-adjusted firm performance.
Further, we find that the firm's unexpected inflation hedging qualities are inversely related to debt maturity. This finding suggests that, everything else being equal, an increase in the holdings of long-term debt appears to attenuate the inflation sensitivity of the firm's nominal returns. Our results also suggest that the firm's unexpected inflation hedging qualities are negatively related to the market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio reflects the extent to which the market value of the firm is backed by assets in place. A higher market-to-book ratio suggests that the firm has growth opportunities that have not materialised into nominal or real assets in place yet. The inflation hedging qualities we explore relate to the extent to which nominal assets in place are financed with nominal debt. A higher market-tobook ratio, suggesting fewer assets in place relative to the market value of the firm, appears to leave equity more exposed to unexpected inflation and, as a result, to attenuate the inflation hedging qualities of investments into the firm's equity.
Column 2 of Table 6 presents the effect of a change in the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities on the change in the firms unexpected inflation beta. The sign on the coefficient is negative, resonating the result for changes in real risk-adjusted performance, but here the coefficient is not statistically significant. Our evidence suggests that the marginal effect on inflation hedging qualities of an additional small shift away from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities is constant. Our result implies that the incentives for firm managers to correct deviations from the optimal match in order to improve the unexpected inflation hedging qualities of investments into their firm's equity do not appear to vary by the magnitude of the current deviation.
Our findings imply that inflation hedging qualities of REITs may vary across firms as a function of their capital structure. Several studies find evidence against the suitability of listed REITs as an inflation hedge, consistent with results commonly established for industrial stocks. 8 Darrat and Glascock (1989) monetary policy, real economic and financial indicators. Subsequently, Glascock, Lu, and So (2002) argue that monetary policy drives the spurious negative relationship between REIT returns and inflation. Simpson, Ramchander, and Webb (2007) distinguish between positive and negative changes in expected and unexpected inflation and present evidence consistent with the suitability of equity REITs as an inflation hedge. Hardin, Jiang, and Wu (2012) argue that inflation illusion may drive the observation that in the short-term, REIT returns often appear to be negatively related to expected inflation. However, many studies to date focus on the index level and thus implicitly assume that inflation hedging properties are equal across firms or exogenously determined. Our findings provide a fundamental economic rationale behind potential variation in inflation hedging properties across REITs that is related to the capital structure choices of these firms.
Further, Case and Wachter (2011) postulate that if firms are net debtors, they will benefit from unexpected changes in the price level through the redistribution effects of inflation. They argue that REITs holding relatively large amounts of fixed-rate debt should on average have relatively stronger returns, all else equal, during periods of high inflation. However, these authors stop short of exploring the empirical evidence for their argument. We present empirical evidence in favour of their argument.
More generally, our findings explore the relationship between the balance of a firm's nominal assets and liabilities and the sensitivity of its equity returns to unexpected inflation. First, firms may not on average be net (nominal) debtors but, as our evidence suggests, match nominal liabilities to nominal assets. The resulting crosssectional variation in nominal liabilities that is difficult to incorporate into analyses on the index level may be partly responsible for the lack of strong evidence for REITs as an inflation hedge. Further, firms may not universally benefit from simply holding more nominal debt. Instead, the exact choice of the amount and term of nominal debt that has to be matched with the amount and maturity of nominal assets appears to matter. This explains why on average, a relationship between total nominal liabilities and the inflation sensitivity of REIT returns may seem weak.
Furthermore, our results imply that REITs hold nominal debt to match nominal assets. Our findings thus contribute to the debate about the potential drivers of REIT leverage choices. This debate is driven by the difficulty to reconcile the theoretical lack of incentive for REITs to use debt with the empirical observation that these firms tend to hold significant levels of leverage, and often more than unregulated firms in a comparable line of business (Alcock, Steiner, and Tan, 2014; Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler, 2011) . 9 Against this background, several authors suggest potential alternative explanations for the determinants of REIT leverage choices. Brown and Riddiough (2003) report that REITs appear to target leverage in order to maintain an investment-grade debt rating. Ooi, Ong, and Li (2010) and Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) suggest that REIT debt issuance decisions are consistent with the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) . Further, Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) suggest that REITs trade off the lack of incentive for debt and the adverse selection cost of equity. Alcock, Steiner, and Tan (2014) find that REITs use debt to signal firm quality and optimise transaction costs. Alcock, Glascock, and Steiner (2013) suggest that REITs employ leverage to manage market exposure and modify risk-adjusted performance. In spite of these numerous suggestions for the drivers of REIT capital structure decisions, Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) conclude that a closer investigation and better understanding of the leverage choices of these firms is needed. Our results suggest that REITs hold debt to match nominal assets in an effort to improve real risk-adjusted performance by managing unexpected inflationary shocks.
Conclusion
In this study, we model the real risk-adjusted return on firm equity as a function of nominal as well as real assets and liabilities. We show that, everything else being equal, firms that match nominal assets with nominal liabilities in a monotonically increasing, linear fashion have improved real risk-adjusted performance. We illustrate that in doing so, firms reduce the sensitivity of real risk-adjusted returns to unexpected inflation, improving the risk efficiency of investments into their equity.
Overall, our study establishes a simple interrelationship between capital structure, real risk-adjusted performance and the inflation hedging qualities of equities invest-
ments.
In order to test the resulting hypotheses, we focus on a sample of US listed eq-9 The interest in REIT capital structure decisions is particularly fuelled by the limited explanatory power of traditional leverage theories given the tax exemption of REITs, their strict pay-out requirements and straight-forward business model. Howe and Shilling (1988) assert that in the absence of tax benefits, REITs cannot compete for debt and will favour equity. Shilling (1994) argues that REIT value is maximised for equity-only financing. Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) argue that, given their simple business model of owning and operating real estate, REITs are a fairly transparent investment vehicle, limiting asymmetric information problems and thus the relevance of the traditional pecking order theory. Pecking order also assumes discretion over earnings, debt and equity. However, REIT pay-out requirements (Lehman and Roth, 2010) largely restrict funding choices to debt and equity.
uity REITs, facilitating the identification of the relevant variables, thus reducing measurement errors and improving the statistical power of our empirical tests. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that US listed equity REITs that adhere to the suggested match between nominal assets and liabilities outperform their peers in terms of the real Sharpe ratio. We further find that increasing deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities reduce the unexpected inflation hedging qualities of investments into the firms' equity.
Our findings have a number of practical implications. Financial managers are able to employ our findings in the development of strategies to enhance real risk-adjusted performance, conditional on a given asset structure. For investors, our finding suggests that they are able to utilise information on the firm's liability structure to draw inferences about the firm's potential to deliver strong real risk-adjusted performance.
Our results therefore have the potential to assist investors in improving the basis of their decision-making process and help promote more efficient investment decisions.
In a wider context, our study contributes to the debate about the drivers of corporate leverage choices. We provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms choose debt holdings so as to improve real risk-adjusted performance via the modification of equity exposure to unexpected inflationary shocks. Our results also contribute to the debate about inflation hedging characteristics of equities investments. We provide evidence that equities investments offer stronger inflation hedging qualities if the firms follow the optimal matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities. Our results allow us to explore an additional dimension of this debate relating to the potential firm-level variation in inflation hedging characteristics. period. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) , and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. We measure unexpected (expected) inflation uncertainty as the annual standard deviation of monthly unexpected (expected) inflation figures over 12 months to year-end.
Simulation for the real excess return to firm equity and its standard deviation Figure   2 (a), and its standard deviation, in Figure 2(b) . The vectors for nominal assets and liabilities, A N 0 , L N 0 , are 101 × 1 each. The vectors for the normal random variables are 1, 000 × 1 each. Nominal assets are defined as A N 0 ∈ [0, 1]. We impose that A N 0 ≥ 0 for going concern. The values for nominal liabilities L N 0 are not restricted. Nominal liabilities are L N 0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Initial equity is E 0 = 1. Real assets are A R 0 = 0.1. Real liabilities are the residual modelled as a linear function of the remaining asset, liability and equity positions,
This structure allows us to focus on nominal liabilities, conditional on a given asset structure and initial equity. The random variables are drawn from a normal distribution. The real return on L R 0 in excess of the risk free rate is r ∼ N (0.05, 0.1). The return differential between real and nominal items is α ∼ N (0.05, 0.05). The return differential between assets and liabilities is κ ∼ N (0.05, 0.04). N (0, 0.05) . . We impose that A N 0 ≥ 0 for going concern. The values for nominal liabilities L N 0 are not restricted. Nominal liabilities are L N 0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Initial equity is E 0 = 1. Real assets are A R 0 = 0.1. Real liabilities are the residual modelled as a linear function of the remaining asset, liability and equity positions,
Unexpected inflation is u ∼
This structure allows us to focus on nominal liabilities, conditional on a given asset structure and initial equity. The random variables are drawn from a normal distribution. The real return on L R 0 in excess of the risk free rate is r ∼ N (0.05, 0.1). The return differential between real and nominal items is α ∼ N (0.05, 0.05). The return differential between assets and liabilities is κ ∼ N (0.05, 0.04). Unexpected inflation is u ∼ N (0, 0.05). . We impose that A N 0 ≥ 0 for going concern. The values for nominal liabilities L N 0 are not restricted and are L N 0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Initial equity is E 0 = 1. Real assets are A R 0 = 0.1. Real liabilities are the residual modelled as a linear function of the remaining asset, liability and equity positions,
This structure allows us to focus on nominal liabilities, conditional on a given asset structure and initial equity. The random variables are vectors of 1, 000×1 and drawn from a normal distribution. The real return on L R 0 in excess of the risk free rate is r ∼ N (0.05, 0.1). The return differential between real and nominal items is α ∼ N (0.05, 0.05). The return differential between assets and liabilities is κ ∼ N (0.05, 0.04). Unexpected inflation is u ∼ N (0, 0.05). The inflation. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) . on unexpected inflation. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) . nominal firm returns to unexpected inflation. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) , and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. In this regression, we control for the excess Table 1 The table shows the results from a set of fixed-effects panel regressions of my chosen proxy for nominal assets, the natural logarithm of the firm's NAV as reported by SN L (discounted at an average rate of 7.5%) on unexpected inflation (Column (1)) and the lag of unexpected inflation (Column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) replicate these regressions in first differences. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) . Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Control variables and proxies
Variable Measurement References
MAT: Debt maturity Ratio of long-term debt maturing in more than 3 years to total debt Leland and Toft (1996) LNSIZE: Firm size Log of market value of the firm's assets Myers and Majluf (1984) PROFIT: Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to book value of assets Donaldson (1961) ; Myers and Majluf (1984) MB: Market-to-book ratio Book value of assets minus book value of common equity plus market value of common equity relative to book value of assets Myers (1977) ABEARN: Abnormal earnings Change in earnings per share relative to share price Ross (1977) VOL Table 2 The Table 3 The . Debt Maturity is measured by the proportion of long-term debt relative to total debt. Log of Asset Maturity is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of depreciable assets to depreciation. Profitability is measured as the ratio of EBITDA to book value of assets. Market-to-book ratio is measured by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Abnormal Earnings is the difference between earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the year t share price. Earnings volatility is measured by the standard deviation of first differences in EBITDA over the four years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets for that period. Term Structure is the difference between the month-end yields on a 10-year government bond and a 6-month government bond, matched to the month of a firm's fiscal year end. Bond yields are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's economic database. Each of the dummy variables (operating loss carried forward and debt rating) equals 1 if the firm has its respective items, 0 otherwise.
Regression results for Hypothesis 1, 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) Table 5 The table presents the results from a set of fixed effects panel regression models for our final sample of REITs over the full period 1989-2011. We estimate the firm's annual real Sharpe ratio (Columns 1 to 3) and the change in the annual real Sharpe ratio (column 2) as a function of the deviation (DEV ) from its optimal nominal liability holdings (column 1) and the change in this deviation (Column 4). We obtain the annual real Sharpe ratio of a firm by computing its average annual real excess return over the risk-free rate and dividing by the volatility of this return. We measure DEV by computing the annual squared differences between nominal assets and liabilities (both deflated by the Producer Price Index constant in August 1982, in millions of US$). In Column (1), DEV is calculated using the constant of proportionality obtained from Table 4 , Column (1). In Column (2), DEV is calculated using the constant of proportionality obtained from Table 4 , Column (4). In Columns (3) and (4), DEV is calculated using a constant of proportionality of unity. We control for the commonly employed capital structure determinants as well as property type and year effects, using dummy variables. Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses, significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Regression results for Hypothesis 2, 1989-2011
(1) Table 6 The table presents the results from a set of fixed effects panel regression models for our final sample of REITs over the full period 1989-2011. We estimate the firms' sensitivity to unexpected inflation as a function of the deviation (assuming a constant of proportionality of unity) from their optimal nominal liabilities (column 1) and present the results from an identical regression considering annual changes in the unexpected inflation beta as a function of changes in this deviation (column 2), controlling for the usual set of capital structure determinants, including maturity, as well as property type and year dummies. We measure the firm's sensitivity to unexpected inflation using annual regressions of the nominal monthly firm excess returns (N RET ) on monthly unexpected inflation (U IN F LS). We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000) , and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. 10 In this regression, we control for the excess return on the market (M KT ), size (SM L) and value (HM L) factors, expected inflation (EXP IN ) and variation in the interest rate proxied by changes in the federal funds rate (CF F R). We collect the coefficients on U IN F L, resulting in a firm-year panel of unexpected inflation sensitivities U IN F LS. We remedy the bias in the standard errors from heteroskedasticity potentially introduced by the estimated dependent variable using robust standard errors clustered by firm (Lewis and Linzer, 2005) . Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses, significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
